Phish Checks
Defense only · No kits · Updated Nov 22, 2026

The phishing checks that still work

Modern phishing does not just steal your password. It sits between you and the real login page, waits for you to finish MFA, then walks off with a live session. Here is how that works, the checks I actually use, and what to do if you already clicked.

How it works now

The old scam copied a login form. The one making the rounds now copies the session after you prove who you are.

  1. The old stealA lookalike page asks for your password. They get the password. MFA, if it is on, still blocks them from walking straight in.
  2. The new stealA page in the middle relays you to the real login. You type the password. You approve the MFA prompt. They copy the session cookie and are already in.
  3. What they do with itInbox rules and hidden forwards. New “signed in with Google” apps. Password resets on your other accounts. You may not notice for days.

What you will hear attackers use

Campaign kits and reverse-proxy tools show up in real incidents. The names help you read a report. This page will not tell you how to run them, set them up, or install anything.

GoPhish King Phisher Evilginx Modlishka

The 12 checks

Save this list. Run it before you type a password, a code, or an approve-the-number prompt.

URL checks

1–5
  1. 1

    Read the real domain, not the display text

    Hover the link on a computer. Long-press it on a phone. The domain in the preview is what matters, not the blue words in the email.

  2. 2

    Hunt for lookalikes

    Swapped letters (rnicrosoft), extra words, a random subdomain in front of the brand, odd endings, or punycode. If it feels off, it is off.

  3. 3

    Type the address, or use a bookmark

    Do not use the button in the email or text. Open the app, or type the site yourself. “Unusual sign-in, review now” is classic bait.

  4. 4

    If your password manager will not fill, stop

    Managers key off the exact domain. A blank fill is a warning that you are not on the real site. Do not type the password by hand to “be helpful.”

  5. 5

    A padlock proves almost nothing

    HTTPS and a certificate are cheap. Fake sites have them too. The lock is not a stamp of “this is Google.”

MFA traps

6–8
  1. 6

    A prompt you did not start is a deny

    Push notification out of nowhere? Deny it. Then open the real site from a bookmark and check the account. Do not approve “just to make it stop.”

  2. 7

    Number matching is not a site check

    Matching the number only proves that you started a login. It does not prove the page in front of you is the real one. It helps against MFA fatigue. It does not stop a session-stealing phish.

  3. 8

    Codes can be typed into a proxied page

    SMS codes and authenticator codes still complete on the real site, through the page in the middle. Finishing that prompt can hand over a live session, not just the password.

Defenses that still hold

9–12
  1. 9

    Use a passkey or a hardware security key

    Passkeys and FIDO2 keys (YubiKey, Titan, a built-in phone or computer passkey) bind the check to the real site origin. A lookalike domain should not get a valid assertion. Put one on email, your password manager, and work if your admin offers it.

  2. 10

    Unique passwords, in a manager

    A reused password turns one phish into five accounts. The manager is also the domain check from item 4. That combination still earns its keep.

  3. 11

    Do not leave SMS as your only second factor

    Move important accounts to a passkey or a hardware key where you can. Keep recovery codes offline, not sitting in the same inbox you are trying to protect.

  4. 12

    Report it, do not “test” the link

    Use Report phishing in Gmail, Outlook, or Apple Mail, or your company’s report button. On the web, Google and Microsoft also accept unsafe-site reports. Do not click through “to see if it is real.”

If you already clicked

If you only opened the page and typed nothing, close the tab and report the message. If you typed a password, or finished MFA, treat the session as stolen and work this list on the real site, opened from a bookmark or an address you typed.

  1. Sign out everywhereUse “sign out all devices” or revoke active sessions. Do this before you do anything else in that inbox.
  2. Change the passwordOn the real site only. Then turn on a passkey or a hardware key so the next phish has less to grab.
  3. Check recovery email and phoneAttackers lock you out by swapping these first. Put them back if they moved.
  4. Hunt inbox rules and forwardsHidden filters and auto-forwards are how they stay in after you “fix” the password.
  5. Revoke unknown appsOAuth grants, “signed in with Google / Microsoft / Apple,” and app passwords you do not recognize. Remove them.
  6. Read the sent folder and security logLook for mail you did not send, new devices, and new locations. Screenshot anything odd for your admin or bank.
  7. Tell work or your bank if it is their accountA work mailbox or a financial login is not a solo project. Report it to the admin or the fraud line.
  8. Assume reused passwords are burnedChange them on the other real sites, from bookmarks, and stop reusing that password.

Do not go back to the link to “check what happened.” Do not send a code, a password, or a “yes that’s me” to anyone who messages you right after. That follow-up is often the same operator.

Quick answers

Short versions of the questions this list always gets.

Is MFA useless now?

No. MFA still stops the old password-only steal. SMS, app codes, and push prompts are not enough against a page that relays a real login and copies the session. Passkeys and hardware keys are the upgrade.

Will a VPN or “the padlock” save me?

No. A VPN changes the path your traffic takes. It does not tell you whether the page is the real site. A padlock only means the connection is encrypted, including to a fake domain.

The email used my name and last login. Is it real?

Those details are easy to fake, or pulled from a prior leak. Open the app or type the address. Do not use the button in the message.

Why did my password manager refuse to fill?

That is a feature. It did not recognize the domain. Do not override it and type the password by hand.

I clicked but I did not type anything. Am I fine?

Usually yes, for this kind of scam. Close the tab, report the message, and keep an eye on the account. If the page asked you to install something or enable a browser notification, treat that as a separate mess: do not install it, and remove anything you just added.